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Ukrainian Migration: An analysis of migration movements to, through and from Ukraine

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International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)

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1. Introduction

Migration management in Ukraine had to meet big challenges in the past and will continue to do so in the future. The various migration flows affecting the country evolve in large quantitative dimensions and against the background of a particularly challenging environment, making functioning migration regulation in Ukraine one of the most challenging migration management tasks in the wider European region. The particular challenges in the Ukrainian context result inter alia from the geographic position of the country along the Eastern migration route, the large size of migration movements taking place in the region and affecting it, the fact that Ukraine like the other successor states of the former Soviet Union had to develop its migration system from scratch, the enormous length of the new external borders and the fact that formerly "internal" migration movements embedded in traditional economic and social ties had to cross international borders between the newly independent states. These factors made Ukraine one of the main transit countries of international migration both to Western Europe and the economic centers of the Russian Federation. At the same time and as a result of the transition period after independence migration-related factors were accompanied by domestic economic, social and demographic factors, which turned Ukraine into a major country of origin of legal and irregular migration flows and - in recent years - increasingly into a country of destination of legal and irregular migration flows. Today, Ukraine represents a country of origin, transit and destination of international migration. In quantitative terms, the better part of these flows takes place in form of regional migration, linking Ukraine with the neighbouring CIS countries to the East as well as the "new" EU Member States to the West. In a nutshell, migration from, through and to Ukraine was and is shaped along five main patterns:

- The return of ethnic minorities to Ukraine that had been forced out of the territory of the Soviet Union after World War II (Crimean Tatars, Mtskhetian Turks, ethnic Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks and Germans);
- The emigration of ethnic minorities from Ukraine (mainly the Ukrainian Jewish community, ethnic Germans, ethnic Russians and other ethnic groups);
- The legal and irregular labour migration from Ukraine to Western European countries;

- Short-term circular labour migration again legal and irregular to Western European countries as well as within the region;
- Irregular transit migration to the West through Ukraine.

2. Socio-Economic Context of Migration

2.1 Demographic developments

As mentioned above, demographic change has to be considered as one of the main factors influencing the migration situation in Ukraine. The population development of Ukraine is characterised by demographic decline. Both birth rates and death rates show comparatively steady trends but as the latter exceed the prior; the overall population in Ukraine is decreasing. Between 1991 and 2009 the total population declined from 51.7 million to 46.0 million, reflecting a sharp decline in birth rate and a net migration outflow. This trend is expected to continue in the years to come, implying that the overall population will decline by another 3.3 million until 2050 (UNDESA 2009). Over the same period Ukraine will be significantly affected by demographic ageing. By 2050 nearly half of the population will be older than 45 years. Over the same period the percentage of Ukrainians in retirement age (aged 65 or over) is expected to rise from 15% to 25%.




Figure 1: Expected population change in Ukraine 2010 - 2050 (in thousands)

Source: United Nations Population Division

2.2 Economy and economic change

The problem of demographic change and decline is closely linked to one of the main challenges the Ukrainian economy is faced with. With an expenditure-to-GDP ratio above 43%, fiscal pressure is particularly high, putting pressure both on taxpayers and investors and inducing to under-report wages and salaries (OECD 2007). Due to demographic ageing and a significant increase in the basic pension scale, Ukraine spends more than 14% of its GDP on pensions, more than most of the industrialized countries do. As demographic ageing will continue at increasing levels, retirement ages need to be adjusted in order to ensure the functioning of the pension system but also continued economic growth.

Economic progress has been significant since independence. Once the severe economic problems during the early years of transition were solved in 1998/1999, the Ukrainian economy grew steadily for almost a decade. Annual growth rates averaged 7.5%, placing them among the highest in Europe. Proven fiscal discipline in the years after 1999 is considered one of the main factors fostering economic development and has supported growth together with comparatively low debts and deficits. However, the global economic and financial crisis in 2008 hit Ukraine hard. GDP contracted by 15% in 2009, with fixed investments falling by 46%. Since October 2008, the national currency Hryvnia has lost about 40% of its value against the US Dollar. In 2009, the economy has gradually stabilized; industrial production has increased and inflation was on the decrease (World Bank 2010). Still, economic reform must remain high on Ukraine's agenda above all addressing the stabilisation of the public finances; improved incentives for public investment; stimulation of private investment; and financial sector reforms.

One of the factors limiting economic development is the high share of informal economic activities. After independence and during the early years of market transformation, the shadow economy increasingly gained in importance. Inefficiencies and deficits in state market regulation, as well as the lack of functioning regulations, structures and procedures under new market economy conditions contributed to this development. But even after market regulation started to become more effective in the late 1990s, the high tax and regulatory pressure continued to induce many economic agents to engage in informal activities. For 1997 it was estimated that nearly half of all economic activities had to be attributed to the informal sector. The informal share has significantly reduced in the years after and continues to do so; still the shadow economy plays an important role in Ukraine. Informal economy is primarily associated with activities of small-scale enterprises

and in the service sector, where state control is difficult to be enforced. The main sectors are retail trade, consumer services, agricultural production, transport and construction (OECD 2009).

2.3 Labour market situation and unemployment

The widespread informal sector also impacts on the Ukrainian labour market and labour market policies. Like in most post-Soviet economies, the transition from centrally planned to a market economy went anything but smoothly. Today, there remains a disproportionally large public sector, low labour force participation and a general lack of decent and productive jobs. The unemployment rate rose from 6.8% in 2006 to 8.8% in 2009, implying that in the later year a total of nearly 2 million Ukrainian citizens were recorded as unemployed. Still, true unemployment is estimated to be a lot higher than these figures. The Ukrainian labour market is characterised by big differences between the regions. Economically speaking, Ukraine is divided between the industrialized eastern regions and the rather rural western regions. The degree of economic divergence between Ukraine's 27 administrative units is comparable to other transition countries but still implies significant differences in economic performance between the regions. The income of the Donetsk region, the wealthiest in Ukraine - is more than three times higher than Ukraine's average, while that of the Chernivtsi region is only less than 50% of the average. The GDP per capita in Kyiv is more than three times higher than Ukraine's average. A third of all foreign direct investments stays in the capital (Sushko, Prystayko, Shulyar 2008). The even more important fact is that the regions are very different regarding their economic dynamism. While the slowest growing regions registered negative growth rates of about 3% in 2005 and after, the most dynamic oblasts grew more than 7%, Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk (Drzeniek-Hanouz, Geiger 2008: 102). The economically disadvantaged regions are characterized by low investment attractiveness and lacking innovation; underdeveloped physical and social infrastructure; weak inter-regional ties; and ineffective use of the existing human capital. Economic asymmetry between the regions and regional disparities in socio-economic development are growing rather than diminishing. The economic disparities and asymmetric development paths between the regions have to be perceived as main factors triggering emigration from the Ukraine. Many among the young and well educated labour force simply don't find any jobs in the areas where they live and have to leave their home region in order to find occupation and income.

Since the domestic labour market is not capable of integrating the mobilized labour force from the region, many take the decision to seek for job opportunities abroad, may it be by use of legal or irregular channels.

2.4 Quality of Education and Human Capital

Ukraine invests a significant share of its GDP in the educational system, public expenditure on education represents more than 5% of GDP. This value is above the OECD average and above all related figures in the other successor states of the Soviet Union. Still, there are major gaps in the education system, hampering both the access to education as well as the integration of graduates in the Ukrainian labour market. The performance of the system is limited by a wide-spread lack of resources impacting on staff qualification, excessive working hours for teachers, training and skills enhancement, curricula and teaching methods, teaching material and equipment. In addition, there are imbalances in the access to education between urban and the rural areas and limited access to education for socially disadvantaged children. Access to preschool education is limited both in big cities and in rural areas, whereas sufficient access to secondary education is missing primarily in the remote rural areas of the country. Moreover, the high education spending does not necessarily comply with the needs of the Ukrainian labour market and does not result in a sufficient number of graduates with the skills required. There is a high rate of enrolment in secondary (97%) and tertiary education (32%) - (BMP 2011). But the participation rate in technical and vocational education and training is too low - 6.7%. compared to over 30% in many EU countries - and many Ukrainian enterprises do not find skilled workers on the domestic market (ETF 2005). There is a clear discrepancy between the training of specialists and employers' demands and similar to the situation in other industrialized countries, the Ukrainian labour market lacks of trained professionals mainly in the production sector, such as technical engineers, welders, electricians, lathe operators or IT specialists. Other missing qualifications include industrial clerks, teachers and medical doctors.

The Ukrainian government is very much aware that the economic development of the country depends on a further improvement of and enhanced access to the educational system. Financial programs corresponding to these needs have been established, aiming at enhanced education opportunities for children from low income families. However, in order to have a real impact, these programs have to be broadened on the one side and to be adapted to the needs of the Ukrainian labour market on the other (MDG Report 2010: 50).

2.5 Brain drain and brain waste

As stated above, Ukraine has to be considered as one of the major emigration countries in the wider European region. In light of the existing skills mismatch between the education system and labour market demands and in absence of sufficient attractive jobs for highly-educated Ukrainians, it is widely agreed that these emigrant categories feature prominently among the Ukrainian diaspora as well. At the same time it has to be stated that there are no comprehensive and sound data on the social-demographic characteristics and levels of professional skills and education of Ukrainian emigrants. Consequently, it is not possible to assess the real size of the share of highly-qualified individuals among the Ukrainian diaspora.

Surveys suggest that the phenomenon of 'brain drain' in Ukraine, defined as the net loss of highly skilled and trained population in the working age through migration, is of considerable size but traditionally moves within margins comparable to other Eastern European countries. In the first ten years after independence, emigration from Ukraine mainly referred to manual employment and the education level of labour emigrants was slightly lower than the average on the domestic labour market. Still, this already implied that the better share of Ukrainian emigrants worked below qualification while being abroad ('brain waste'), mainly in agriculture, tourism and catering, construction or domestic aid. The last decade saw an increasing trend towards emigration of academic researchers and highly-qualified professionals. Partly the highly skilled found occupation abroad related to their qualifications, partly they had to work below their qualification. Frequently quoted estimates speaking about more than 30% of the Ukrainian academics having left the country are clearly exaggerated, available figures suggest much lower rates. However, the emigration of academics and highly-qualified individuals has impacted on development of Ukrainian research and economy (Parkhomenko 2006).

The most recent and accurate information on the education and skills level of Ukrainian emigrants has been provided by a large scale survey conducted by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in the framework of the "ETF Migration and Skills Project" in the years 2006 to 2008 (ETF 2009a). The survey investigated the links between migration and skills and based its findings on data analysis and large-scale field surveys with 2,000 respondents each from Albania, Egypt, Moldova,

Tunisia and Ukraine. The focus was on "potential migrants" in the age group 18 – 40 years as well as on "returning migrants" who had left Ukraine aged 18 or over, had lived and worked abroad continuously for at least six months and had returned at least three months before being interviewed. The motivations, expectations and experiences expressed by the two groups of respondents provide an excellent and - based on the large size of the sample – representative overview of the dynamics of Ukrainian emigration and return migration also in the context of the highly qualified. The findings of the survey can be summarized as follows:

- About 58% of all respondents either intended or concretely planned to leave the country to live and work abroad. 26.7% of respondents had already developed concrete plans for emigration including time horizon, financial means for the move, specific knowledge on a desired destination country and obtainment of the necessary documents.
- 56.3% of the respondents named the improvement of their living standards and the prospect of higher salaries as main motivations for potential emigration. Only 6.9% of the respondents stated that a lack of employment in Ukraine was the main reason for them to consider a move abroad.
- Potential migration from as well as return migration to Ukraine is of a "gender balanced" nature. The share of females among potential emigrants is 48%, among returning migrants 41%.
- About 63% of all potential emigrants are in the age group 18 29, whereas only 48% of all returning migrants are members of the same category.
- Most respondents, both in the area of potential migrants (96.6%) as well as in the area of returning migrants (98.4%) had medium or high education levels.
- Roughly 49% of the potential migrants indicated that they wanted to move to EU, 51.5% of the returning migrants stated that they had returned from an EU country to Ukraine.
- About 72% of all respondents considered to move abroad despite the fact that they were holding a job in Ukraine. About 73% of returning migrants

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¹ Respondents who indicated during their interviews that they were 'seriously thinking of leaving abroad to live and work.

- stated that they didn't have difficulties in finding a job once they had returned to their home country.
- The responses of returning migrants revealed that almost none of them had managed to find jobs abroad corresponding to their education and skills levels. Regardless of whether they ranged in high, medium or low skills levels, almost all of them had been hired as skilled or unskilled workers while being abroad.
- Corresponding to the comparatively high share of temporary and seasonal patterns among Ukrainian emigration, more than 30% of the respondents indicated that they intended to move abroad again, preferably to the same country of destination.
- Only a small share of returning migrants, about 12%, had used or managed to use - their stay abroad for study or training.
- Consequently, study or training are not considered to be the main benefits of living and working abroad. It is mainly the skills learned abroad and the general experience gained that returning migrants regard as main benefits of emigration.
- About 27% of returning migrants named family reasons as the main cause for their return. Only about 14% had returned to Ukraine because they had lost their job or their work permit had ended in the country of destination.

High government spending on education and high participation rates in secondary and tertiary education lead to high levels of education among the Ukrainian population. At the same time qualifications do not correspond to the needs of the Ukrainian labour market in a sufficient way nor does the domestic labour market provide enough opportunities attractive for the highly skilled. Though sound data do not exist, available information and statistics suggest that there is significant emigration of young and highly qualified labour force from Ukraine. According to related research, nearly two thirds of all potential migrants from Ukraine are between 18 and 29 years old, more than 96% of them have medium or high education levels and 72% of them are already working in Ukraine. Taking into account that almost none of migrants returning to Ukraine had found a job corresponding to their skills or education level while staying abroad and that only 12% of them had been able to use their stay for training and study purposes, it is safe to say that Ukrainian emigration at least to a certain extent is characterized by 'brain drain' and 'brain waste'. The improvement of living standards for migrants and their families is the

main underlying reason for emigration from the country. Ukrainian migrants are ready to work below qualification as long as they are in a position to fulfill this goal. State policies and labour market reform that ensure a better matching of education, qualification and labour market needs and the creation of jobs attractive for qualified Ukrainians will be key factors to mitigate the size of skilled emigration and brain drain and to secure existing skills for economic development in Ukraine. At the same time, the receiving countries, such as the EU Member States, should develop increased awareness of the skills potential coming from Ukraine and of the fact that most of this potential is 'wasted' on non-skilled occupation in times when the global competition for talent and qualification is constantly increasing.

2.6 The impact of migrant remittances

The issue of remittances is closely linked to the phenomenon of 'brain drain' as outlined above. The need to financially support their families urges many of the young, qualified and competitive Ukrainians to seek for higher income opportunities abroad even if this implies that they have to take jobs they are over-qualified for. The various statistics on migrants' remittances in Ukraine compiled by the Ukrainian government as well as international actors are fragmentary and provide sometimes conflicting information. Officially recorded annual migrant workers' remittances represent between 0.7% and 1.0% of the GDP. According to a World Bank study conducted in 2006 the total amount of remittances for Moldova and Ukraine summed up to a total of USD 0.44 billion, a sum that it is believed to underestimate the real size of remittances significantly. The World Bank also assumes that the true size of remittances, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is likely to exceed this figure by far (World Bank 2007). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) estimated the size of remittances to Ukraine at USD 8.5 billion for 2006, representing 8.0% of the country's GDP that year. Regardless of the various estimates there is wide consensus that Ukrainian families strongly depend on financial transfers from abroad. Estimates assess the monthly average income of migratory households as summing up to one third of the total nominal income of the Ukrainian population. Most of Ukrainian emigrants regularly transfer money back home, be it via formal or informal channels. According to related research, migrants that had a legal status in their country of residence transferred on average 2,831 USD, migrants without legal status 2,551 USD, and migrants whose legal status was unclear 2,511 USD, figures that also reveal that irregular migrants from Ukraine do not encounter huge difficulties in obtaining informal work abroad (Open Ukraine Fund 2009: 51-53). At the same time it is not perfectly clear whether remittances contribute positively to economic growth in Ukraine or not. As a matter of fact, remittances seem to have a double-edged impact. There is evidence that labour emigration and remittances foster small business development and stimulate the formation of a middle class in Ukraine. Hypothetical models estimate that the Ukrainian economy would have lost about 7% of its potential without the stimulating effects of emigrant remittances (CASE 2008: 16). But there is also evidence that the increase in money supply by way of remittances leads to inflation and that remittances are mainly spent on consumption and not used for investment or credit. A survey conducted by the ETF established that in 2008 app. 73% of remittances were used for living expenses, app. 26% for furniture and consumer goods and only 3.3% for setting up a business (ETF 2009b: 120). Moreover, emigration of young and well-educated Ukrainians reduces the qualified work force and hampers potentially the economic development in the country (Malynovska 2004).

3. Statistical Analysis of Ukrainian Migration

3.1 Immigration movements to Ukraine

3.1.1 Immigration flows

Ukraine records only very low numbers of immigrants with an average annual number of some 19,000 immigrants between 2006 and 2009. In those four years the most important source country was the Russian Federation. According to data based on statistics provided by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, immigration from Russia dropped sharply in 2009 while the immigration flows from Turkey became increasingly important. Newly arrived immigrants from Turkey constituted the most important inflow in 2009, making up for more than one third of the total immigration to the country. Prior to 2009, immigration from the Russian Federation constituted the most important inflow with some 30% of the total volume.

Table 1: Number of immigrant inflows to Ukraine 2006 to 2009

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total	15,778	24,032	27,842	8,628
Turkey	615	1,052	1,397	3,041
Russian Federation	4,153	7,092	8,703	442
Germany	177	274	321	306
China	395	587	615	299
Vietnam	1,475	1,648	1,778	259
India	430	500	524	214
France	55	82	197	154
Italy	139	187	179	152
United Kingdom	146	147	199	145
Czech Republic	42	72	123	129
Azerbaijan	407	593	918	127
Israel	882	1,347	1,297	123
Serbia	92	94	55	108
Bulgaria	238	300	278	104
Other	6,532	10,057	11,258	3,025

Source: Adapted from BMP 2011

3.1.2 Stocks of foreign-born persons and foreign citizens

Although reliable data on the real size of immigration and on the respective countries of origin of immigrants are hardly available, the present profile analyses and presents statistics on immigrants residing in Ukraine from several data sources. In general, there are big discrepancies between available official migration data and estimates on the real size of immigration to Ukraine. While official Ukrainian figures indicate a total of between 150,000 and 170,000 immigrants residing on the territory of Ukraine for the years 2006 – 2008 respectively, other sources speak about 5 – 7 million immigrants on the territory of Ukraine. These discrepancies result from incomplete data collection in the migration field but also from the application of different legal categories when it comes to the definition of the term 'migrant'. When taking these gaps into account and treating figures mainly as indicators, the various statistics provide a realistic overview of the trends and dynamics of migration flows affecting Ukraine, though, as stated before, the real quantitative dimension of international migration from, to and through the country cannot be measured precisely on basis of the existing data material.

One of the data sources used is the Global Migrants Database (2010) set up and maintained by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (2010). The database includes information on the foreign-born population for 226 countries in the year 2000 and thus allows a rough estimation of the most important immigrant groups in Ukraine. When looking at the number of persons born outside Ukraine only, the Global Migrant Database reports almost seven million foreign-born persons, who were living in Ukraine some ten years ago. With 70%, the vast majority of these foreign-born persons were born in Russia. Further important groups originated from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - each group making up for some 5% of the foreign-born population – as well as Moldova constituting app. 3% of the foreign-born population in Ukraine. The UN Population Division estimates a slightly smaller total of 5.5 million immigrants for the year 2000 and 5.3 million immigrants for the year 2010 (UN 2009). These figures imply that Ukraine was the fourth largest migrant-receiving country in the world for this year. However, it is important to stress that the number of 5.4 million immigrants included all residents of Ukraine that were born outside of Ukraine before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and are perceived neither by themselves nor by the Ukrainian society as immigrants but as ethnic Ukrainians (European Commission 2009). Another source on the migrant population in Ukraine is data compiled by the secretariat of the Söderköping

Process (2011), which reported the number of immigrants on the territory of Ukraine for the years 2006 to 2008 and based related figures on official statistics provided by the Ukrainian government. According to these data, the total number of immigrants in Ukraine has increased from app. 150,000 in 2006 to app. 170,000 in 2008.

The large variations in available sources lead to the basic conclusion that the real size of immigration to Ukraine has to remain unknown due to the lack of comprehensive and reliable data. However, there is consensus among all estimates and analyses when it comes to the main countries of origin of immigration to Ukraine. About 87% of all officially registered immigrants originate from other CIS countries. The most important immigrant group is the one originating from the Russian Federation. In the first half of 2008 60% of all immigrants residing in Ukraine came from Russia. Thus, the share of Russian immigrants is slightly higher among so called non-quota immigrants, i.e. immigrants outside labour market oriented immigration schemes. Further important immigrant groups originate from Moldova (5.0% in 2008), Armenia (4.4%), are stateless persons (4.1%), come from Uzbekistan (3.8%) and Georgia (3.6%) and Azerbaijan (3.2%).

Table 2: Stocks of immigrants in Ukraine by origin, 2006 to 2008

	2006				2007			I – VI 2008		
	Total	Quota	Non- Quota	Total	Quota	Non- Quota	Total	Quota	Non- Quota	
Total	14,940	32,315	11,709	16,502	34,053	13,097	17,073	34,530	13,620	
Russia	87,805	16,764	71,041	98,906	17,812	81,094	10,264	17,908	84,732	
Moldova	7,107	2,014	5,093	8,118	2,152	5,966	8,597	2,251	6,346	
Stateless	7,018	1,709	5,309	7,052	1,735	5,317	7,018	1,731	5,287	
Uzbekist.	6,319	1,717	4,602	6,463	1,862	4,601	6,423	1,885	4,538	
Armenia	6,062	1,770	4,292	7,116	2,023	5,093	7,463	2,087	5,376	
Georgia	5,474	1,407	4,067	5,315	1,458	4,457	6,134	1,466	4,668	
Azerbaijan	4,301	1,280	3,021	5,170	1,488	3,682	5,428	1,533	3,895	
Belarus	3,398	768	2,630	3,920	825	3,095	4,073	838	3,235	
Kazakhstan	3,068	813	2,255	3,328	859	2,469	3,300	852	2,448	
Vietnam	3,021	1,341	1,680	3,220	1,471	1,749	3,373	1,600	1,773	
Israel	1,290	331	959	1,403	319	1,084	1,409	317	1,092	
Lithuania	998	167	831	1,108	177	931	1,129	184	945	
Turkmeni.	951	225	726	1,004	255	749	1,006	254	752	
Other	13,027	1,963	11,064	12,906	1,617	10,689	12,740	1,624	11,116	

Source: BMP (2011)

3.1.3 Asylum migration to Ukraine

When compared to other European countries, and most prominently to those who are Member States of the European Union, asylum migration has not been an important issue in the Ukraine in terms of the quantity of related flows. Figure 2 shows the development of asylum applications in Ukraine as well as the estimated refugee population from 1996 to 2009. The highest number of asylum applications was reported for 1997 with some 2,700 applications. In 2002, with a total of 457 applications, the lowest number of annual applications was reported during this period. Between 2006 and 2008 the annual applications constantly exceeded 2,000, but dropped in 2009 somewhat below 1,700, a value that also presents the annual average figure over all years of observation. The most important country of origin of asylum seekers in Ukraine is Afghanistan. Out of the 16,647 asylum applications reported for the years 2000 to 2009 around 20% (or 3,385 in total) were lodged by

Afghan nationals. During the same time period other important countries of origin of asylum seekers in Ukraine were Pakistan (12.3%), India (10.7%), the Russian Federation (9.0%), Bangladesh (6.1%) and Iraq (5.2%).²




Figure 2: Asylum applications and refugee population in Ukraine, 1996 to 2009

Source: Own presentation based on data from UNHCR 2007: 530 and UNHCR Website (cited in BMP 2011)

The estimated number of refugees residing in Ukraine reached its peak in 1998 with a total of app. 6,100 refugees. Since 1999 the estimated number of refugees remained rather stable with annual stocks slightly below the number of 2,600. The most important country of origin of refugee stocks in Ukraine in 2009 was Afghanistan. In 2009, 1,239 or 53% of the 2,334 refugees originated from Afghanistan. Further groups with significant numbers of refugees came from Armenia (8%), Azerbaijan (8%) and the Russian Federation (5%).

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² Own calculations based on data from UNHCR Website (cited in BMP 2011)

³ Own calculations based on data from UNHCR Website (cited in BMP 2011).

3.1.4 Irregular migration to and through Ukraine, human smuggling and trafficking in human beings

It is widely agreed that Ukraine is one of the European countries affected the most by irregular migration flows. Over the last 20 years it has been and continues to be a major transit country for mainly irregular migration flows to the EU moving along the so called "Central and Eastern European route", originating from Ukraine, Belarus or Russia, passing either through Belarus, or Ukraine to Slovakia and Hungary and further on to the Schengen area. But in recent years, Ukraine increasingly developed to a destination country of irregular migration flows as well. This trend is partly owed to EU and Schengen enlargement and the stepping up of the Eastern borders of the 'new' Member States of the European Union. For many irregular migrants on the way to the West this development implied that they could not overcome the EU's external borders and found themselves 'stranded' in Ukraine. But as a result of economic growth and increased demand for cheap labour, Ukraine has also become an attractive destination country for labour migrants coming to the country legally or in an irregular fashion.

Thorough estimates on the size of irregular migration are even harder to make than in the area of legal migration. Again, one has to rely on indicators based on available statistics. One way to assess the significance of irregular migration to Ukraine is the analysis of the number of apprehensions of persons for violating the immigration regulations. These numbers are, however, influenced by several factors, including the 'success rate 'of irregular migrants and professional human smugglers, the efforts and strategies in enforcing the immigration legislation of the authorities (police) and changes in the legal regulations.

ICMPD's annual "Yearbooks on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe" provide comprehensive statistics on illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking in Ukraine (compiled in Table 3). For the years 2005 to 2009 a total of 54,824 migration related apprehensions were reported for Ukraine, representing an average of almost 11,000 apprehensions per year. However, the annual number of apprehensions dropped in these five years from some 13,000 in 2005 to app. 8,600 in 2009. Contrary to the decreasing trend in migration related apprehensions and deportations from Ukraine, the number of rejections at the Ukrainian border has increased between 2005 and 2008 by 42% from app. 27,000 to app. 38,000. The number of rejections dropped in 2009 to

31,369; a number which lies only slightly below the annual average of these five years (annual Ø 32,303).

Table 3: Enforcement of immigration legislation in Ukraine, 2005-2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Migration related apprehensions	12,977	12,363	10,993	9,922	8,569
Persons deported from Ukraine*	n.a.	5,406	4,464	3,738	2,885
Persons deported from Ukraine**	12,375	11,128	12,783	n.a.	n.a.
Persons rejected at the border	26,913	28,417	36,612	38,205	31,369
Human smugglers apprehended***	77	88/47	41*	78	84
Persons being smuggled***	4,814	4,789/1,347	1,121	n.a.	n.a.
Persons trafficked to Ukraine***	1,441	1,361/393	366	n.a.	n.a.

^{*} number from the State Border Service of Ukraine only; ** number of persons removed by services subordinate to the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine; *** different numbers for 2006 provided Sources: Futo/ Jandl 2007, Futo 2008 and 2010, ICMPD forthcoming

Besides the size and trends of irregular migration, statistics on border apprehensions differentiated by border section and direction of movement indicate the major directions of irregular migration into, from and through Ukraine. Figure 3 presents major irregular migration flows according to the number of border apprehensions as reported by the authorities of Ukraine and its neighbouring countries in 2008.⁴ Again, it is important to keep in mind that the numbers are not only influenced by irregular migration movements but also by police activities (i.e. whether the authorities concentrate more on illegal entries or exits and which border sections are more policed than others). Due to the assumption that the number of irregular migration movements between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is much higher than officially recorded, a larger dashed arrow was included in Figure 3 to illustrate the most likely scenario at the Ukrainian-Russian border.⁵

⁴ No data available from Moldova and the Russian Federation.

⁵ This assumption is also corroborated by the fact that the numbers of apprehensions of persons entering Ukraine illegally as reported by the Ukrainian authorities only are highest at the border to Russia (see Table A1, Annex).




Figure 3: Border apprehensions in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, 2008

Source: Own presentation based on data from ICMPD's Yearbooks, Table A1, Annex

Besides Russia, the most important border section, for which apprehensions of persons travelling irregularly in the direction to Ukraine were reported, was the one shared with Poland. 2,200 apprehensions of persons leaving Poland and entering Ukraine were reported by the Polish authorities in 2008. Furthermore, Hungary appears to be an important entry point of persons who were travelling without authorisation with some 900 apprehensions in 2008 as reported by the Hungarian authorities. Since the most important group of citizens apprehended in these two countries (Poland and Hungary) were Ukrainians, apprehensions at these border sections mainly concern return migration of Ukrainian citizens who had stayed illegally in the European Union and were on the way back to their home country. Altogether one third of the reported apprehensions concerns persons leaving a neighbouring country and entering Ukraine. In 2008, important exit points of persons

travelling irregularly from or through Ukraine were along the borders to Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. At these three border sections altogether 5,960 apprehensions were reported by the authorities of the four countries concerned; 41% of them by the Ukrainian authorities.

Statistics on human smuggling and trafficking in Ukraine vary considerably according to different data sources. In the years 2005 to 2009, between 40 and 90 persons were apprehended by the Ukrainian authorities for assisting persons in illegally crossing borders every year. In the same time period, different sources reported 1,000 to almost 5,000 cases of smuggled persons that came to the attention of the Ukrainian authorities on an annual basis. The reported numbers of persons that had been trafficked to Ukraine vary between 300 and more than 1,400 persons over the same time period. It has to be stressed that the real size of this migration related crime is hard to assess since a large number of cases go unreported. It is widely agreed that at present Ukraine is a source, transit and increasingly destination country for men, women, and children subject to trafficking in persons, especially in the areas of forced labour and forced prostitution. However, Ukraine is still and primarily to be perceived as a country of origin of victims of trafficking. According to police investigations and evidence gathered by International Organisations, Ukrainian victims are trafficked to Russia, Belarus, EU countries, Switzerland, Turkey, the Middle East, the United States and Canada. Most cases reported on trafficking victims from and in Ukraine refer to sexual exploitation. So far, there is only limited information on cases of labour exploitation or other forms of exploitation. Female victims are forced into prostitution or subject to involuntary domestic servitude or forced labour. Incidental evidence suggests that male victims of trafficking are regularly forced into labour or exploitation when they stay illegally in Russia but also in other countries, primarily in construction, the light industry or agriculture (TIP 2010: 332). According to the statistics provided by the IOM office in Ukraine, the organization assisted a total of 6,836 victims of trafficking in reintegration between 2000 and 2010, a figure that indicates the considerable size of this migration related crime in the case of Ukraine (IOM 2010).

3.2 Emigration from Ukraine

As most countries' migration policies focus on immigration control and consequently gather information and statistics for immigrants, be it legal, irregular or asylum migrants, rather than for their own citizens leaving the country to settle abroad, the

measurement of emigration is even more difficult than the assessment of the size of immigration. Sound figures on emigration are limited, both official statistics and estimates on the total number of emigrants from Ukraine are incomplete and vary significantly. Available figures and estimates range from 3 to 5 million Ukrainian emigrants for the period between 1990 and 2006. For the recent past, there exist data on officially registered emigrants. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior the annual emigration rate ranged between 30,000 and 40,000 persons for the years 2005 to 2007. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports some 565,000 Ukrainian citizens that were registered at Consular Divisions abroad at the end of 2007 (BMP 2011). A second possibility to assess the size of emigration from Ukraine more precisely is to look at the immigration figures related to Ukrainian citizens in the receiving countries. In the following these figures will be analysed and presented. In addition, statistics on irregular migration and naturalisation of Ukrainians in Europe will be presented as well.

Before looking at the volume migration from Ukraine westwards, a few facts about the general structure and prevailing patterns of Ukrainian emigration flows shall be discussed at this point. It is a particular feature of Ukrainian emigration that it encompasses temporary and circular schemes more regularly than to be observed in the context of other important source countries of international migration flows. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that about 5 million Ukrainians work abroad on a temporary basis (Kyzma 2008). This figure implies that 4 to 15% of the entire population, or 20% of the population in a working age is at least temporarily engaged in emigration. According to official statistics, app. 37% of Ukrainian labour migrants leave the country on a temporary basis in order to live and work abroad for the duration between 1 and 3 months. Only 16.2% hold a permanent residence or work permit in their respective countries of destination. Thus, the duration of stay depends on the proximity between Ukraine and the respective country of destination. In the neighbouring countries Hungary, Poland and Russia, the majority of Ukrainian migrants stays for 1 to 3 months only. For the south-western EU countries the duration of stay increases and larger shares of Ukrainian migrants stay for more than one year. But also these migrants often do not plan to settle in their country of residence permanently but want to return to Ukraine once they have accomplished their migration goals.

3.2.1 Ukrainian-born persons and Ukrainian citizens abroad

The above mentioned Global Migrant Database provides a very good picture of the distribution of Ukrainian-born persons on a global scale. The database includes figures on Ukrainian-born persons in 225 countries for the year 2006, based on information provided by national statistics mainly from the 2000 round of censuses. According to this database, almost 5.9 million persons who had been born in Ukraine lived outside their home country at the turn of the century. About 61% of those persons (3.5 million persons in total figures) resided on the territory of the Russian Federation. Other important receiving countries of Ukrainian emigrants were the USA, Poland and Kazakhstan with some 300,000 Ukrainian-born residents. Moldova, Belarus, Israel and Germany are other important countries of residence for Ukrainian-born persons with numbers of residents between 130,000 and 220,000 persons. Pakistan, Canada, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Jordan and Kuwait reported almost 60,000 residents that were born in Ukraine. These figures reveal that Ukrainian emigrant communities are located all around the world. The most prominent Ukrainian communities in quantitative terms are to be found in the CIS region (mainly on the territory of the Russian Federation) and Northern America, but also in countries in the Middle East. Around the year 2000, the most important receiving countries of Ukrainian migrants in the European Union were Poland and Germany as well as the Czech Republic and Latvia. A more up to date picture of Ukrainian emigrants in the European Union is provided by the population statistics from Eurostat.




Figure 4: Ukrainian-born persons residing outside of Ukraine in 2000

Source: Own presentation based on own calculations with data from the Global Migrant Database (2010)

Since the statistics on the population by country of birth are not consistently available for recent years, the remainder of this section describes the number of Ukrainian citizens in the European Union in order to indicate the scale of Ukrainians living in the EU (see Table A2, Annex). In 2009 some 650,000 Ukrainian citizens were residing in the EU27, three quarters of them on the territories of the EU15. The most important host countries were Italy (24% of the total of Ukrainian immigrants in the EU), Germany (21%), the Czech Republic (19%), Spain (13%) and Portugal (8%). Consequently, almost 85% of all Ukrainians in the EU27 were concentrated in these five EU Member States in 2009. The total numbers of Ukrainians in the five countries ranged from 52,000 in Portugal to 154,000 in Italy. Further countries with considerable Ukrainian communities were Hungary, the United Kingdom and Greece hosting between 10,000 and 20,000 thousand Ukrainian citizens. In Poland the registered number of Ukrainian citizens was comparably low with only 8,800 in 2009, however, more than 430,000 persons living in Poland were reported as "born in Ukraine".

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⁶ There are no data available for Cyprus and the figures include estimates as well as data for other years in case no statistics were available for 2009.

In 2009, Ukrainian citizens constituted 2.1% of the total foreign population residing in an EU27 country and 3.3% of all third country nationals in the EU27. The highest percentages of Ukrainian citizens of the total foreign population in a EU27 country were found in the Czech Republic and Poland with 30% and 25%, respectively. Furthermore, Ukrainians made up for a considerable share among the foreign population in Portugal, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Lithuania. In these countries the share of Ukrainians of the total foreign population ranged between 6% and 12%. Notably, Ukrainian citizens did not account for a considerable proportion of the total foreign population in their major host countries – Italy, Germany and Spain – (4% in Italy, 1.9% in Germany and 1.5% in Spain).

Concerning the gender ratio of Ukrainian citizens in the EU, women are clearly overrepresented: almost 60% of Ukrainians residing in the EU were female in 2009. Particularly in Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden women represent 70% or more of all Ukrainian immigrants. This high share of females among Ukrainian immigrants is not observable in all EU countries. Especially in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Portugal and the Baltic countries the percentage of men among Ukrainian immigrants is considerably higher.

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⁷ Excluding numbers from Belgium

⁸ The same is true for Norway and Switzerland were women represent almost 80% of the total number of Ukrainians.




Figure 5: Numbers of Ukrainian citizens in the EU in 2009

Source: Own presentation based on Eurostat data, table migr_pop1ctz, extracted on 13 November 2010

3.2.2 Immigration of Ukrainians to Europe

General immigration flows. The statistical agency of the European Union, Eurostat, provides statistics on immigration and emigration by citizenship for each EU Member State. By deducting the number of emigrants from the number of immigrants the net migration of Ukrainians to each of the countries can be calculated. Consistent data


on immigration and emigration by citizenship are, however, only available for 17 EU countries as well as for Switzerland and Norway. The following analysis only refers to these 19 countries. In the 19 countries the average annual net migration of Ukrainians reached almost 49,000 in the years 1999 to 2008. This means that the European Union gained almost half a million Ukrainians in the past decade. As already indicated by the population statistics in the previous section, the most important receiving countries were Italy, the Czech Republic, Germany and Spain. The net migration to the above mentioned 19 countries has increased between 1999 and 2003 to almost 79,000. Since 2004 the annual net migration numbers remained fairly stable around 58,000 per year. Net migration to Germany and Spain shows a clear downward trend since 2001 and 2004, respectively. The development of Ukrainian migration to Italy was unstable and the Czech Republic reports a strong increase in net migration in the past years (though the number has dropped again in the last year of observation, 2008, cf. Figure 6).

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⁹ The countries are CZ, DK, DE, EE, ES, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, SI, SK, FI, SE, NO and CH. It has to be kept in mind that immigration and even more emigration movements are notoriously difficult to estimate. Therefore, the statistics are to be read cautiously. Abrupt in- or decreases in time series statistics might also be traced back to changes in the data collection practices.

¹⁰ There are no emigration statistics available for Portugal and the numbers of Ukrainians moving to Portugal are rather low.

Figure 6: Standardised net migration of Ukrainian citizens to Europe, 1999 to 2008



Source: Own presentation and own calculations based on Eurostat data, tables migr_imm1ctz and migr_emi1ctz, extracted on 13 Nov. 2010

Asylum applications. Compared to other major source countries of asylum seekers in the EU, Ukrainian asylum migration is moving along rather low trends. In the years 1992 to 2009 the EU27, Norway and Switzerland registered some 58,000 asylum applications lodged by asylum seekers originating from Ukraine. The most important destination countries in the past two decades were the Czech Republic and Germany. These two countries recorded app. 13,000 asylum applications lodged by Ukrainians, representing 46% of all applications in the EU27, Norway and Switzerland since 1992. Further important destination countries for Ukrainian asylum seekers were France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. These countries reported between 3,000 and 5,000 applications in the time period observed. The total annual number of asylum applications lodged by Ukrainians remained relatively stable during the 1990s, ranging between 1,000 and 3,000 in total. Between 1999 and 2001 the numbers of asylum applications increased strongly, peaking at 9,516 applications in 2001. After 2001 the annual numbers dropped sharply until 2007, since when the annual numbers remained at app. 1,000. During the 1990s the total numbers of applications were mainly influenced by developments in Germany. Asylum migration from Ukraine to Germany continuously lost in importance over the past decade. Between 1992 and 1997 on average 1,500 applications were reported per year. In 1998 the annual numbers dropped below 1,000 and in 2006 even below

100. In the Czech Republic, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom asylum applications by Ukrainians peaked in the years 2000 and 2001 and decreased afterwards. The peak in the Czech Republic in the year 2001 is especially noteworthy with a total of over 4,400, which is almost half of the total number of applications in the EU in 2001.

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Figure 7: Asylum applications by Ukrainians in EU27, Norway and Switzerland, 1992 to 2009

Source: Own presentation based on data from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, UNHCR, Data extracted: 13 November 2010

When comparing the numbers of Ukrainian asylum applications to the numbers of net migration of Ukrainians to the EU it becomes obvious that asylum migration does not play an important role anymore. There was no statistical relationship to be observed between the recorded net migration from Ukraine and annual trends in asylum applications over the past decade and the number of asylum applications is by far lower than the number of recorded immigrants. In general, the recognition rate for Ukrainian asylum seekers is low. In 2009 out of 475 decisions on asylum applications by Ukrainian citizens in the European Union only 40 or 8.4% were positive. In 2008 a similar proportion of decisions was positive, 8.2% out of 850 decisions.

Residence permits. As of 2008, detailed statistics on residence permits are available at Eurostat. First residence permit statistics are available by reason for granting residence (family, education, remunerated activity and other) and citizenship. These statistics include residence permits granted to third country nationals, which are valid for at least three months. In 2009 87,572 first residence permits were granted to

Ukrainian citizens in the EU27 and Norway. Most permits were issued in Italy, where altogether 39,640 permits were issued (45.3% of all permits in the European countries which reported related statistics to Eurostat). Other important countries that issued first residence permits to Ukrainian citizens were Poland and the Czech Republic (each issued around 8,000 permits in 2009) as well as Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and Hungary (between 3,000 and 5,000 first residence permits in 2009).

More than half of these residence permits were issued for remunerated activities, hence for regular employment. 21% of all residence permits were issued for reasons related to family formation and reunification and 8% for reasons related to education and study. 18% were issued for 'other' reasons (see Figure 8). Thus, the respective shares of types of permit correspond to immigration patterns and depend on whether a Ukrainian community had been existing already at the beginning of the century or not. In Italy, where most residence permits were issued to Ukrainians, most permits were issued for reasons related to employment (73.4%). In the Czech Republic half of the permits issued to Ukraine citizens concerned work related activities, but residence permits for reasons of family reunification and formation featured more prominently than in Italy (CZ: 51.2% work, 39,4% family). In Poland, based on its traditional ties with Ukraine, family related immigration presents the most important reason for granting first residence permits in 2009 closely followed by work related residence permits (32.6% work, 36.3% family).

100% 521 853 15739 7660 90% ■ Other 80% 2751 70% 4069 Remunerated activity 60% 46493 50% 1779 29080 Education 224 40% 30% 7349 Family 20% 3131 3064 10% 17991 268 2632

CZ

PL

Figure 8: First residence permits granted to Ukrainian nationals in the EU27 and Norway, and selected countries, by reason in 2009

Source: Eurostat database, table migr_resfirst, data extracted on 18 Nov. 2010

IT

0%

Total EU + NO

In 2008 and 2009, the number of first residence permits granted to Ukrainians decreased significantly. Since no data are available from Italy for 2008, from Cyprus for 2009 and from Luxembourg for both years, a comparison of the residence permits statistics in 2008 and 2009 needs to be made without data from these three countries and hence only concern 24 EU Member States and Norway. In 2008, 72,659 first residence permits were issued to Ukrainian citizens in these 25 countries. In 2009 the number dropped by a third to 47,932. These figures suggest that the global economic crisis, which had started in 2008, decreased the demand for Ukrainian labour force in the Union and Norway and subsequently led to a reduction of immigration from the country. Looking at the most important countries issuing residence permits to Ukrainians (except Italy), considerable decreases in the annual number of residence permits were observable in Hungary (-70%), the Czech Republic (-60%) and Spain (-40%). However, Germany (+38%), the UK (+7%) and Poland (+5.5%) reported increasing numbers of residence permits issued to

Ukrainians. The decrease in residence permits issued to Ukrainians mainly concerns residence permits issued for reasons related to remunerated activities, which dropped by more than 50% from 37,027 to 17,413.¹¹ However, the number of all other types of permits also dropped in these 25 countries; -16% family, -15% education and -10% 'other'.

3.2.3 Irregular migration and return

It is impossible to quantify the real extent to which Ukrainian citizens stay abroad in an irregular manner, i.e. without fulfilling the necessary formal requirements for entry, stay or work. Existing estimates vary considerably but it is safe to say that Ukrainian irregular emigration is of considerable quantity. The high estimates are closely linked to prevailing migration patterns. Emigration from Ukraine is mainly of temporary and circular nature and is targeted towards neighbouring countries or countries within the EU. The majority of Ukrainian emigrants return back home regularly, do not encounter too many difficulties in obtaining informal employment abroad and are often engaged in sectors like agriculture, tourism or domestic aid, where informal employment is somewhat tolerated. Thus, they do not always rely on obtaining a legal status in their respective country of destination. Research conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms in cooperation with the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine indicated that in the years 2007 to 2008 about 23.2% of all labour migrants residing abroad did not have a legal status in the country of destination (i.e. did not have a residence permit and/or work permit, or temporary registration). This implies an estimate of about 300,000 Ukrainian nationals residing and/or working abroad with irregular status in 2007 - 2008. Other sources estimate even bigger quantities of irregular emigration from Ukraine. The CLANDESTINO project database contains data on the main destination countries within the EU (Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, and Austria). According to this database, potentially up to 40,000 illegal emigrants from Ukraine reside in Italy, app. 150,000 in the Czech Republic and up to 500,000 in Poland (Hamburg Institute of International Economics 2008). Regularisation programmes in Europe are another

¹¹ A decrease in residence permits for employment is also observable in Germany and the UK, where the total numbers increase mainly due to the increase in family related residence permits.

source of information allowing for estimates on the size and distribution of irregular emigration from Ukraine. Greece regularized the stay of a total of 3.677 irregular migrants from Ukraine in 2005, Spain 19,460 Ukrainian irregular migrants from Ukraine for the same year, Italy regularized a total of 101,651 Ukrainians in 2002 (Baldwin-Edwards, Kraler 2009).

Statistics on the enforcement of immigration legislation in the EU also allow for a general assessment of development of irregular migration patterns followed by Ukrainian citizens to, within and through Europe. As mentioned above the statistics are influenced by several factors and an increase or decrease in the numbers do not necessarily reflect an increase or decrease in the actual phenomenon of irregular migration. First of all, the number of Ukrainian citizens who were refused to enter the EU indicates to what extent persons might try to enter an EU country outside regular migration schemes. In 2008, 15,750 Ukrainians were refused entry at the external borders of the EU. In 2009 the number increased by almost a quarter to 19,445. Compared to the total number of refusals of almost 500,000 in 2009, the refusals of Ukrainian citizens accounted for 3.9%. Most refusals at the border were reported at the Polish borders, where two thirds of all refusals took place (12,800). The second most important border section of refusals of Ukrainian citizens was the external Hungarian border, where 3,710 or 20% of all refusals in 2009 took place. Other important border sections were the external borders of Romania (4.8%) and Slovakia (3.9%) (see also Section 2.1.4).

A further indicator regarding irregular migration movements of Ukrainian citizens in the EU is the number of persons found to be illegally present in one of the Member States. This number dropped from 2008 to 2009 by 13% from 14,150 to 12,285. These numbers present 2.3% and 2.2% of the total number of persons found to be illegally present in the EU. In 2009, most Ukrainians were found to be illegally present in Poland and Hungary (each 16.8% of the total number in the EU), followed by the Czech Republic and Italy (each 12%) as well as Germany (9.4%) and Spain (8.6%). Persons found to be illegally present might be ordered to leave the country by the authorities of the respective Member State. In 2008 and 2009 14,605 and 13,540 Ukrainians were ordered to leave the territory of one of the EU Member States (-7.3%), accounting for 2.4% and 2.3% of the total number of persons ordered to leave. Most orders to leave were issued in Poland (39.4% of the total number in the EU), the Czech Republic (11.6%), Italy (10.9%) and Spain (9.4%).

Figure 9: Enforcement of immigration legislation concerning Ukraine citizens in the EU, 2008 and 2009

Source: Own presentation based on data from Eurostat, tables migr_eiord, migr_eipre, migr_eirfs, migr_eirtn, extracted on 18 Nov. 2010

an order to leave

Returned following | Found to be illegally

present

Refused at the

external border

Ordered to leave

Finally, persons who are apprehended for staying in an EU country without any authorisation can be forcibly returned (deported) or return voluntarily by themselves or within the framework of a return programme. However, persons might also remain in the country without being authorised to do so and thus remain to be illegally present or fall into some sort of 'tolerated' status (cf. Kraler, Vogel forthcoming). In 2009, reportedly 8,340 Ukrainian citizens were returned following an order to leave. This is a decrease by almost 16% compared to the year 2008 when 9,920 returns were registered. However, when measuring valid leave orders (13, 540) against effected and recorded returns (8,340), the average European return rate for Ukraine was at 61.6% in 2009. This was one of highest values among all major countries of origin of immigration to Europe. In 2009, more than half of all returns were reported by Poland. Furthermore, the United Kingdom (8.4%) and the Czech Republic (5.0%) returned/deported relatively many Ukrainians. Returns of Ukrainians represent some 3-4% of the total number of returns in the EU in both years. The numbers of returns include forced returns (deportations) and voluntary assisted returns, consequently

excluding unassisted voluntary returns.¹² In the years 2006 to 2009 only 45 persons were returned to Ukraine in the framework of an assisted voluntary return programme (EMN NCP Poland 2009: 18). The difference in the numbers of persons ordered to leave and persons returned following an order to leave (4,685 in 2008 and 5,200 in 2009) indicates the number of persons who left/ returned voluntarily, the number of persons who stayed in the country without authorisation and of persons who could not be returned due to several reasons (cf. Kraler and Vogel forthcoming).¹³ Given the high number of apprehensions of Ukrainian citizens at the Polish borders attempting to leave the Schengen area and to return to their home country, it can be assumed that a large part of the Ukrainians illegally present and/ or ordered to leave are typical "overstayers" and actually return back home voluntarily and on their own account.

3.2.4 Naturalisation of (former) Ukrainian citizens in Europe

Finally, the number of Ukrainians who acquire the nationality of a Member State of the EU is of importance. Naturalisation indicates permanent settlement of immigrants, since it is strongly associated with the decision to remain in a country and the dismissal of plans to return to the country of origin (cf. Reichel 2010). In the years 2002 to 2008 Eurostat reported some 56,600 acquisitions of the nationality of an EU Member State by (formerly) Ukrainian citizens. The annual developments of these acquisitions remained relatively stable with an annual average of around 8,300 acquisitions in the seven years of observation. Ukrainians mostly acquire German citizenship. Between 2002 and 2008 over 25,000 Ukrainians became German nationals. Further important countries granting citizenship to Ukrainians were the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, Italy as well as the Czech Republic (see Table 4).

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¹² Except these data are reliably collected which is rarely the case in EU countries.

¹³ However, returns do not necessarily correspond to orders to leave of the same year.

Table 4: Acquisitions of citizenship in a EU27 country by (former) Ukrainian citizens, 2002-2008

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total	%
Total	6,088	7,348	8,034	8,158	8,729	11,422	8,500	58,279	100%
DE	3,656	3,889	3,844	3,363	4,536	4,454	1,953	25,695	44%
UK	*420	380	470	860	865	*1,220	706	4,921	8%
HU	340	570	568	828	541	834	857	4,538	8%
PL	198	433	538	758	433	665	587	3,612	6%
IT	n.a.	224	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	*1,389	1,601	3,214	6%
CZ	251	419	446	239	425	424	397	2,601	4%
Other	1,223	1,433	2,168	2,110	1,929	2,436	23,99	13,698	24%

Source: Eurostat, table migr_acq, extracted on 18 Nov. 2010 and (*) EUDO Citizenship database (extracted on 18 Dec. 2010)

4. Conclusion

Ukraine is one of the European countries affected the most by international migration flows. Traditionally a country of origin and transit it develops more and more to a country of destination as well. What is most striking is the large scale of migration movements that are frequently quoted in the Ukrainian context. The various estimates speak about up to more than 5 million immigrants residing on the territory of Ukraine, 3 to 5 million Ukrainian emigrants living in countries all over the world, and up to 4 million Ukrainians staying abroad in an irregular manner. There are no unambiguous data on the real quantities of the various migration flows from, to and through Ukraine, however, all available statistics suggest that many of the existing estimates are highly exaggerated and the real size of migrant flows and stocks is much lower. Official Ukrainian statistics, for instance, speak about app. 170,000 immigrants residing in the country in the year 2006, the Member States of the European Union have recorded the immigration of app. 500,000 Ukrainians over the past decade and more thorough assessments assume that a maximum of 300,000 Ukrainians stay and work abroad with an irregular status every year, most of them on a temporary basis. But even when referring to the most conservative estimates it becomes evident that migration in Ukraine is of high significance both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

What are the main determinants of the present Ukrainian migration environment and its links to the broader European migration system? First, it is the geographic position at the intersection of main migration routes to Western Europe and increasingly to the economic centers of the Russian Federation, which make the country an important stage for regular and irregular migrants on their way to their desired countries of destination. Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union turned many Ukrainians into citizens of other newly sovereign states while large groups of persons on the territory of Ukraine turned into ethnic minorities, many of them having citizenship from other CIS countries. Consequently, the application of citizenship for the definition of 'immigrants' or 'emigrants' is problematic in the case of Ukraine and also explains the high migration figures that are frequently quoted for the country. Third, the emergence of new state sovereignty did not cut off traditional economic, social and cultural ties in the region but turned traditional forms of interaction into movements across state borders. Fourth and closely linked to the previous point, the respective migration management systems in the CIS region were not fully adapted

to deal with the new situation. The huge challenges of political and economic transition did not leave enough capacities to keep up with the size of cross-border mobility; migration control and legislation did not cater for an effective management of entry, residence or work permits. This had the unintended consequence that bureaucratic hurdles and inefficient legislation somewhat forced many labour migrants into an irregular status though they themselves and the host state had a strong interest in their legal stay. Fifth, the economic transition after independence resulted in severe job loss in the country and forced many of the young Ukrainians to move and work abroad to support their relatives back home, even if that implied that they have to work under an irregular status and below qualification. There has been significant economic growth over the last decade in Ukraine but the domestic labour market still does not offer a sufficient number of decent jobs for the young and mostly well-educated generation. The proximity to the countries of the European Union and the huge wage differentials continue to induce many young Ukrainians to seek better living conditions and earning opportunities abroad. The impact of remittances on the economic situation is unambiguous, but is not questioned that many families in Ukraine strongly depend on financial support from abroad and will continue to do so in the future. Sixth, economic growth also implied that Ukraine increasingly developed into a country of destination for international migrants. Also against the background of demographic ageing and the loss of work force due to emigration, more and more work opportunities for legal and irregular immigrants emerged. This trend was reinforced by the enlargement of the European Union and the fact that Ukraine now shares Schengen borders with its neighbours to the west. The increased control mechanisms at these borders implied that many irregular migrants, whose initial plans were to transit Ukraine on their way to the west, did not make it over these borders anymore and stayed in the country. The development into an 'unintended country of destination' will become an increasing challenge for Ukraine in the years to come. However, the real 'migration magnets' for international migrants, the EU and Russia, are west and east of Ukraine and the country will have to be perceived primarily as a transit country also in the future. Seventh, emigration from Ukraine largely takes place in form of circular or temporary migration. Migrants from Ukraine, legal and irregular ones, tend to return back home to their country on a regular basis and settle in respective countries of destination less frequently on a permanent basis than other immigrant groups.

The several dimensions of migration from, to and through Ukraine that have been outlined here call for enhanced cooperation between the country and its partners to the west and east. Ukraine needs continued support in further developing its

migration management capacities, ranging from border management to asylum, reception, labour migration, integration, return and reintegration. The countries of the European Union are also called to enhance cooperation with Ukraine on the management of irregular transit flows affecting the country and - as mentioned before - increasingly turning into permanent stay. The building of functioning cooperation with the countries of origin of these flows cannot be achieved by Ukraine alone and it is a European responsibility to address this issue in a joint and cooperative manner. Moreover, the Member States of the EU have to acknowledge the fact that Ukraine is affected negatively by the loss of young and well educated work force that to a large extent moves to EU countries and works there below qualification and often with an irregular status. Partly the issues of 'brain drain' and 'brain loss' have to be addressed by a reform of the educational system, by labour market reform and the creation of decent jobs in Ukraine. Partly they could also be addressed by a further promotion of immigration schemes for highly qualified Ukrainians in the EU, by skills matching and professional training for prospective migrants from the country and by the conclusion of targeted labour agreements. In view of the 'global hunt for talent' and the Europe-wide need for highly qualified labour force, while at the same time recognising that migration from Ukraine takes place in form of the 'circular migration' patterns already now, enhanced and cooperative policies on labour migration are suited to serve the benefits of Ukraine, the countries of the European Union and Ukrainian migrants alike.

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6. Annex

Table A1: Apprehensions at Ukrainian borders as reported by Ukraine and neighbouring countries by direction and border section, 2008

Border	Entering	Leaving	Total	Leaving	Entering	Total	Total-
Section	UA	neighbouring		UA	neighbouring		total
		country in			country from		
		direction UA			UA		
Poland	1	2,203	2,204	395	596	991	3,195
Slovakia	12	-	12	1,378	978	2,356	2,368
Hungary	2	906	908	816	756	1,572	2,480
Romania	4	-	4	244	1,788	2,032	2,036
Moldova	23	n.a.	23	11	n.a.	11	34
Russia	325	n.a.	325	34	n.a.	34	359
Belarus	29	153	182	7	177	184	366
Other	20	n.a.	20	63	n.a.	63	83
Total	416	3,262	3,678	2,948	4,295	7,243	10,921

No data available from Moldova and the Russian Federation

Source: Futo 2010

Table A2: Population by citizenship in the EU in 2009

Country citizens citizens nationals citizens citizens BE 10750000 971448 2458 8 BG 7606551 23838 20306 2132 5 CZ 10467542 407541 261727 123203 726 DK 5511451 320033 211366 5819 34	-	Total	Total foreign			Male	
BE 10750000 971448 2458 8 BG 7606551 23838 20306 2132 5 CZ 10467542 407541 261727 123203 726 DK 5511451 320033 211366 5819 34	-		i otal loreign	country	Ukraine	Ukraine	
BG 7606551 23838 20306 2132 5 CZ 10467542 407541 261727 123203 726 DK 5511451 320033 211366 5819 34	E	citizens	citizens	nationals	citizens	citizens	
CZ 10467542 407541 261727 123203 726 DK 5511451 320033 211366 5819 34) <u></u>	10750000	971448		2458	847	
DK 5511451 320033 211366 5819 34	3G	7606551	23838	20306	2132	558	
	Z	10467542	407541	261727	123203	72628	
DE 82002356 7185921 4655215 137461 530	K	5511451	320033	211366	5819	3463	
	ΡE	82002356	7185921	4655215	137461	53098	
EE 1340415 214437 204805 2867 15	Ε	1340415	214437	204805	2867	1520	
IE 4450030 441059 76212 1544 7	E	4450030	441059	76212	1544	797	
GR 11260402 929530 767919 13616	SR .	11260402	929530	767919	13616		
ES 45828172 5650968 3376810 82298 386	S	45828172	5650968	3376810	82298	38656	
FR 64366894 3737549 2435198 6995 24	R	64366894	3737549	2435198	6995	2410	
IT 60045068 3891295 2759528 153998 309	Γ	60045068	3891295	2759528	153998	30992	
CY	Υ						
LV 2261294 404013 394607 2898 15	.V	2261294	404013	394607	2898	1577	
LT 3349872 41505 38994 2640 14	.T	3349872	41505	38994	2640	1484	
LU 493500 214848 29494 180	.U	493500	214848	29494	180	23	
HU 10030975 186365 76561 17614 88	IU	10030975	186365	76561	17614	8811	
MT 413607 18128 9883 281 1	ſΤ	413607	18128	9883	281	120	
		16485787	637136	346719	2517	762	
AT 8355260 864397 547402 5283 15	\T	8355260	864397	547402	5283	1522	
PL 37867903 35933 25618 8831 26	L	37867903	35933	25618	8831	2625	
		10627250				30109	
		21498616	31354	25313	814	355	
		2032362	70554	66359	1021	267	
	SK .		52545			2426	
			142288			858	
			547664			617	
		61595091	4184011	2390814	14000	6135	
ICE 319368 24379 5025	CE	319368	24379	5025			
				137552		331	
			1669715	635952	4355	935	
HR 4436401 37100		4436401	37100				
TK 71517100 103753 58424 2099 3	'K	71517100	103753	58424	2099	341	
EIL4E 2000F2000 20404040 40007F40 400F70 400F70	11.45	200050000	00404040	10007510	400570	470000	
						170289	
		498635313	31647462	19481519	649594	262660	
EU 27 +							
CH, NO 511136421 33620085 20255023 655478 2639	H, NO	511136421	33620085	20255023	655478	263926	
Total 587409290 33785317 20318472 657577 2642			33785317	20318472	657577	264267	

* All excluding CY!!

Legend: 2008 not available 2000/2001 2005

Source: Eurostat database, table migr_pop1ctz, data extracted on 13 Nov. 2010